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Faculty and Deans

CONFLICT OF LAWS

June. 1966

I.
DIR~CTIONS: (a) Use the forln provided, not your bluebook. for answering this
portlon of tl:le examination. (b) Each correct answer will count 1/2 point for you;
each·ir.c0rrect one will count an equal arr-.ount against you, whUe an unan~red
question will not count at all. The:"efore, do!l£!.. ar.swer a question at all unless
reasonably sure you are ·_'ight. (c) Nlco.rk each true statelnent "T" and eac~ false
statement IIF".
.
Choose the answer that seer~lS mos~ generally
right. where a completely correct answer is not possible; do not add explanation.
(d) Assume, unless otherwise stated, that the jurisdictions involved are States
of the United St?tes.

1.

Reasons of forUIn public. policy justify F2 in refusing to enforce a valid Fl
judgment of the type normally enforceable in sister-States.
(

2.

F may refuse, for reasons of forwn public policy, to enforce rights arising
under a sister-State statute.
( )

3.

Renvoi is a favored doctrine in the United States, and is therefore applicable
to most conflict of laws pro1-lems here.
( )

4.

Renvoi is unknown outside the Unhed States.

5.

Situs law governs title to real property.

6.

Pearson v Northeast Airlines. used the salne rationale as Kilberg v Northeast AU'lines.
( )

7.

Domicile is a concept of increasing importance in conflict of laws.

8.

Theoretically, an executor or administrator has: no existence as such outside
the State of his appointment.

9.

Babcock v Jackson follows o:.·thodox choice -of-law rules.

(

(

10. An Fl judgment in personam need not be respected in F2 if Fl jurisdiction
over the defendant, a nonresident of Fl not in Fl at the time, had been obtained by service by publication.
( )
11. Under older conflicts rules, an Fl judgment requiring future periodic payment of alimony had to be given full effect when sued on in F2.
( )
12. An Fl judgme1'lt of a type normally enforceable in sister-States will be
rendered unenforceable in F2 by the fact that it was based upon a misinterpretation of F2 law.
( )
13. The forum will usually enforce the criminal judgments of a sister-State.
14. An F 1 judgment containing FIls explicit finding that it had jurisdiction can
be collaterally-attacked in F2 for want of jurisdiction by a party to the Fl
( )
action.
15. The outcome of a case may depend upon the characterization of its cause of
action.
16. Characterization may depend upon the purpose for which it is done.
17. The full faith and credit requirement of the United States Constitution provides an added sanction to the rule of res judicata. where an Fl judgment is
sought to be enforced in F2.
( )
a
18. A valid judgment need not be enforced in/sister-State ' whose courts do not
have jurisdiction to decide domestic causes of action of the sort that formed
the basis for that judgment.
( )
19. IIQualification Statutes II have to do with the doing of business by corporations
in States othe r that those of incorporation.
( )
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20. Statutes of the State of incorporation normally govern intracorporate relations.
( )
II.

~25

points)

Mather. a Maryland resident domiciled in Maryland. was hired in Maryland
by Colonial Electric Co. (a District of Columbia corporation; to work as an
electrician on a housing project in Virginia for which Colonial was a subcontractor ana Woodner Co. (a Virginia corporation) the principal contractor. While
at work in Virg~nia. Mather was ordered to go into the District of Columbia with
a Woodner Co. truck and Vvoo<h'vr Co. driver. to select and br~ng back some
special switches. While in the Distl'ict of Columbia on this errand. Mather
suffered serious inJuries in an accident caused by the negligence of this driver.
Colonial carried workmen's com-pensation insurance for Mather's benefit
under the Maryland. Virginia and District of Columbia Workmen's Compensation
Act. Woodner le. d: workmen's compensation insurance for Mather's benefit under
the Virginia and Maryland acts only.
Under the Virglnia and Maryland acts. a principal contractor. at:! well as the
subcontractor who employs the worker. is oIliable to pay any workman .•. any
compensation under this artide which he would have been liable to pay if that
workman had been immediately employed by him. II If the principal contractor
dces not take out workmen's cOlTIpensation insurance he is subject to negligence
suit:; by employees of his subcontractors; but \."hen th~ principal contractor does
carry workmen's compensation insurance on the subcontractor's employee. he
is relieved by the Maryland and Virginia statutes of any common law liability to
the employees of his subcontractor.
Under the D. C. Act the principal contractor is liable for the payment of
workmen's compensation to employees of a subcontractor only if the subcontractor has not hilnsel£ taken out workmen's compensation insurance. When an
industrial injury occurs in the D. C •• and only the subcontractor has taken out
insurance, the principal contractor is liable to suit for negligence brought by an
employee of the subcontractor. Under these circumstances the D. C. Act gives
an injured employee the right to elect. on notice to the Workmen's Compensation
Commissioner. to receive the compensation provided by the employer, or to
recover damages against any third party (including the principal contractor)
alleged to be liable.
Mather elected to sue ·Woodner Co. as a third party in the U. S. District
Court for the District of Columbia, giving the required notice to the Commissioner. In the trial court, Mather won a verdict and judgment for $60.000 damages,
and Woodner Co. appeals.
Vrhat conflict of laws issues arise in this case?
court decide. and why?
III.

How should the appellate

( 25 points)

On February 6, 1963. petitioner, a citizen of Ohio. filed her complaint in
the District Court for the District of Massachusetts. claiming damages in excess of $10.000 for personal injuries resultL'lg from an autOlTIobile accident in
South Carolina. allegedly caused by the negligence of one Osgood, a Massachusetts citizen, deceased at the time of filing the complaint. Respondent, Osgood's
executor and also a Massachusetts citizen, was named as defendant. On February 8, service was made by leaving copies of the summons and the complaint
with respondent's wife at his residence, concededly in compliance with the relevant Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. Rule 4(d)(1). which provides:
"
The summons and complaint shall be served together. The plaintiff
shall furnish the person making service with such copies as are necessary.
Service shall be made as follows:
"(1) Upon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent person,
by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to him personally
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or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of
abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
th~rein ••.•• II
Respondent filed his answer alid n'1otion for sUI . :1.mary judgment on March 2.
1963. alleging. inter alia. that the action could not be maintained because it had
been brought "contrary to and in violation of the provisions of Massachusetts
General Laws (Tel'. Ed. ) Chapter 197. Section 9. (Noncompliance was later
admitted b y petitioner.) That section provides:
ITExcept as provided in this chapter. an executor or ac1ministrator shall
not be held to answer to an action by a creditor of the deceased which
is not commenced within one year from the time of his giving bond fOJ:
the performance of his trust, or to such action which is commenced
within said year unless before the expiration thereof the writ in such
action has been served by delivery in hand upon such executor Or
administrator or service thereof accepted by him or a notice sti'\ting
the name of the eS '~ate, the name and addre r s of the creditor, tre amoUIt
of the claim and the cOurt in which tl'.e action har been brought has been
filed in the proper registry of probate ••..•• II
Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann •• c. 197, sec. 9. (1958).
(Respondent had filed bond as required by Section 9 on March l, 1962.)
The Distr;ct Court granted re.::;t)ondent's nlOtion f-:>r summary judgment on
the ground of inadequacy of the service under :tvfass. Sec. 9, supra; t~e Court
of Appeals fnr the First Circuit affirmed. The U. S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari. What result, and why? Why do these facts present a case that is
markedly different to the usual diversity-jurisdiction case?
IV.

(20 points)

Dean, plaintiff's intestate, died as a result of eating part of a can of d:'seased
corned beef that he had bought frorn a local grocer in Ohio, of which he was a
resident. The grocer had bought the meat from a wholesaler in Ohio, who had
in turn. bought it from the defendant; the defendant, a New York resident, had
imported it from South Amedca. where it was processed and canned by another
concern. and shiI-ped it from New York, the port of ent r y, to the Ohio wholesaler.
The consequent wrongful death action was brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of N ew York, i t s jurisdiction being based
on diversity of citizenship.
The plaintiff sought recove r y on the gl"ound that the defe ndant's negligence
had caused the meat eo be poisonous. He offered no proof of actual fault, however,
relying, instead, on section 12760 of the Ohio Code. That section provided:
"Whoever sells, offers for sale or has in possession with intent to sell, diseased,
corrupted, adulterated or unwholesome provisions without making the condition
thereof known to the buyer, shall be fined or imprisoned. or both. 11
Ohio decisions held that violation of this statute creates liability without
negligence. N ew York has a similar statu~e.•
Can the plaintiff recover, and, if so, why?
V.

Discuss.

(20 points)
In 1965, the plaintiff, SInith, a resident of State X, and the defendant, Brown,

a resident of State Y, signed a gualanty agreement in which they jointly and severally guaranteed payment of a loan by the B a nk of X (located at Junction City, X)
to the U. S. Dingbat Corp. in the principal sum of $500, 000. Upon default in repayment of the loan, Smith, the guarantor residel1.t in X. was required to pay to
the Bank of X the entire principal and interest due on the loan. Smith now seeks
contribution from his co-gua r antor, Brow n. in a diversity action in the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of Y.
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It is clear that the guaranty agreement is invaiid under the usury laws of Y,
but valid under those of X. That a g reeme nt was signed by Bruwn in Y, but contemplated by its express tel'ms acceptance by the extension of credit when it
stated: II • • • all extension of credit ••• lua d e b y Bank to bo!'rowe-r shall be conclusively presumed to have been made in acceptance hereof. II
What conflicts issues a ~· e there in this case?

Who shou:d win?

Why?

